Abstract-Automatic Dependent Surve (ADS-B) systems provide to the air traffic cont and status information of the cooperating targe to jamming and/or spoofing of the ADS-B ch study, as well as verification and validation te paper, we show how a low cost jammer can receiver. Three types of threats were evaluated receiver permitted to evaluate the received si and without jammer. The measurements w coupling the receiver antenna with the in-cab frequency (1090 MHz) signal. The results show as a function of jammer range and jammer type solutions are proposed to mitigate the effects evaluate their effectiveness are described.
I. INTRODUCTION TO ADS-B SYSTEM
VULNERABILITY TO JAMMING Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broad becoming of widespread use in mode Management. These systems use the SSR Mo the messages from the aircraft to locate a cooperating targets in their coverage area [1] -B operation the aircraft (targets) positions are on-board navigation subsystem (usually GP kind of systems have various advantages as co classical radar surveillance. The biggest o implementation and, then, the low cost of the h a very high accuracy of position data.
The ADS-B disadvantages are related to th the navigation satellite system (that could b damaged) and also on the very simple proto based upon the Mode S squitter emitted from t 1090 MHz aeronautic band. Every aircraft em bits message made up by a preamble followed without any cryptography or authentication. A Mode S Reply is shown in Figure 1 [2] . In the ADSderived from the PS-based). These ompared with the one is the easy hardware and the he dependency on be corrupted, or ocol "free to air", the aircraft on the mits a 56 or 112 d by a data block An example of a iating the simple ADS-B receivers follow the stan Figure 2 two possible implementa one is a non-coherent receiver that t receiver that convert directly the RF to be digitized and processed specifications and receiver logics as implementation uses an IF coherent the intermediate frequency. 56/112 μs data block signals are processed with Hilbert filtering (or equivalent) to extract the I and Q components to be processed according to the standards, as in the first case.
ADS-B systems can suffer by any corruption of the navigation subsystem that provides the position data. Moreover, a system malfunction can be caused by an in band (1090 MHz) jammer that creates voluntary interferences to the receivers. Note that the ADS-B information can be indirectly corrupted also by a GPS jammer; the related problems and the mitigation are addressed in [3] , not in this paper.
All main blocks of an ADS-B receiver (figure 2) can be affected by unwanted interference or jamming and spoofing signals, as follows.
• High power jammers cause saturation of an amplification stage (or of the limiter).
• Unwanted signals in the Mode S band change the SNR/SIR (Signal to Noise Ratio/Signal to Interference Ratio) and produce false alarms (if the threshold is fixed), or missed detections (if the threshold is varying as in the case of Constant False Alarm Rate threshold).
• ADS-B receivers usually implements validation logics to be sure that, for example, a valid message is received (preamble identification) and that the message is not corrupted by other messages. However, validation logics are prone to "smart" jamming signals, mimicking the Mode S/ADS-B ones. In fact, the receiver typically is looking for the preamble. If the jammer send a train of preambles these function of the receiver will be denied.
Moreover, jamming signals composed by a train of pulses, formatted as Mode S signals but without any operational meaning, can stress the receiver till the saturation of its computational power.
• Spoofing i.e. intentional harmful signal with the same characteristics of the valid signals, create false targets or saturate the processing.
Considering these scenarios it is important to evaluate how much a standard or an enhanced receiver can be prone to jamming. In fact, it is very easy to develop (or buy) a transmitter on the L band able to produce PPM modulated signal [4] , as shown in the following Section.
II. JAMMER IMPLEMENTATION AND TEST BED DESCRIPTION
A jammer device has been implemented in the Tor Vergata "RadarLab" with the NI USRP 2920 a Software Defined Radio (SDR) device with Rx/Tx capabilities in the 50-2200 MHz band [5] - [6] . Three possible jamming-waveforms were analyzed (figure 3):
(a) an ADS-B message with a random data-block, repeated with an inter-message time equal to 10 µs;
(b) a stream of ICAO standard preambles;
(c) a random binary sequence with PPM modulation.
These waveforms were selected in order to stress as much as possible the receiver (in particular pulse validation logics and preamble detection logics).
Figure 3 -Jammer-waveforms

Figure 4 Test-bed block diagram
The RF (1090 MHz) output of the USRP 2920 is coupled to the antenna signal by a combiner. The output of the combiner is fed into a 1090 MHz multichannel receiver. Figure 4 shows the deployment of the test bed. The multichannel receiver, called TDR (Transponder Data Recorder), designed and developed at Tor Vergata University [7] , is composed by the antenna, the analog section and the digital section. The antenna ( Figure 5 ) is an array of six patch elements placed on the Engineering Faculty roof; the analog section is a dedicated front-end for RF signal reception and down conversion with five channels: four independent linear channels and one 'logarithmic' channel. The four linear channels, connected to the four central array elements, downconvert the signals to intermediate frequency (IF) at 21.5 MHz. The logarithmic channel, connected to one side array element, is based on the Analog Devices AD8313 [8] log receiver, with a base-band output.
The TDR digital section is based on a NI platform composed by the controller NI PXIe 8135, three acquisition cards NI PXIe 5122 and a FPGA card NI FlexRio PXIe7966. Each acquisition card NI PXIe 5122 has two input channels, and a sample rate up to 100 Msamples/s. These devices ( Figure  6 ) are controlled by software in LabView programming environment. 
TDR
Varying the USRP output gain/attenuation simulate the variation of range between the and the jammer source. Figure 7 shows the shown in Figure 1 , corrupted by a high power
Figure 5 -TDR Antenna
Analyzing the received traffic with two p channels it is possible to evaluate the effect of in terms of missed detection, as a function source range and for a variety of waveform typ Theoretically the NI USRP used jammer at 1 km can reduce the receiver to 35 km from the orig coverage of a stand-alone ADS-B receiver sensitivity). Figure 8 and Figure 9 shows the results obtained decoding only the Airborne Position Messages DF17 (APM-DF17). The APM-DF17's contain the identity (ICAO address) and the 3D position data of the sources. The identity permit to perform a Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC) to count the number of decoded bit errors. Figure 8 shows the maximum coverage of the station with or without jamming (that is the distance of the farther airplane detected) for different possible jammer-ADS-B station simulated distances. Figure 9 shows the number of DF17 detected and decoded with no error (i.e. with CRC OK) with or without the jammer. It results that for any type of jammer the capability to produce harmful interference is very high. The three types of jammer produce a reduction of the coverage depending on the relative range. The coverage is limited to 160-200 km by a jammer at 6.92 km, and in the worst case the coverage is reduced at 30-40 km by a jammer at 1.10 km. The results from the measurements are quite similar to the theoretical one. Figure 10 shows an example of this harmful effect: the upperside of the figure shows jammer-free extracted plots, the bottom-side of the figure shows the plots extracted by the same signal corrupted by the jammer. Figure 11 is a zoom of figure 10 area close to the coast. It shows that apart from the coverage reduction, the jammer also causes the loss of some plots of a near airborne target. It is also visible the loss of the two messages emitted by the aircraft on the runway. The coverage and detected signals reduction due to reduced SIR, are the consequence of two main effects in the receiver :
• the probability of detection of a valid pulse is reduced • the extraction of the information is corrupted and the CRC test is not passed.
Figure 8 -Max range with three types of jammer, EIRP = 20 dBm
Another important effect is the overhead of the processor that can cause the service interruption or the loss of data (the receiver operates in real-time).
For example it results that the jammer type (a) and jammer type (c) produce in the worst case up to ca. 50000 detection events (using RTCA DO 260A algorithms [2] ) in six seconds (the real detection number without jamming is ca. 2000 in six seconds considering all Mode S signals).
Figure 9 -No. of DF 17 with no detected errors versus the jammer range
The receiving station has to execute (for any detection) all the algorithms to validate the replies and, only after these controls, can declare that they are false alarms. Therefore jammers and spoofers cannot be mitigated by decoding algorithms or by system level validation (i.e. MLAT check [20] ), but must be mitigated at the signal level, i.e. before the detection and decoding procedures.
IV. MITIGATION AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
Different methods for ADS-B protection and security assessment have been proposed [14] - [15] . In [9] a survey of risk mitigation methods is reported. The state of the art is based on the implementation of "high level" solu these solutions need system up-dating or the im new system functionalities. For exampl multilateration-based position data check nee the high-level software to implement the re operator control to enable-disable the fun propose to add a "low level" solution to be im receiver, in particular in the "digital processing 2. The "digital processing" block, perform operations: 1) pulses extraction, 2) preamble sequence decoding, 4) message information proposed method consists on the use of processing algorithms useful for detection a overlapping signals. These methods have be for non-directive antenna equipped receiver (s B ground station), in high traffic density probability to receive overlapping signals from not negligible. Considering the jammer mitigation problem can be treated as a sig problem. The signal separation method implemented in the "digital processing" blo 'pulses extraction' and the 'preamble detection The benefit from the usage of t possibility to 'remove' the jammer s restoring the receiver coverage an computational load. Moreover, also failure, the knowledge about th available. The stand-alone receiver a suspicious signals rate increase, t high level control should be set integrity-monitoring.
We proposed a separation Algorithm for Single Antenna (PA receiver, and array processing b Projection Algorithm (PA) and E multi-channel receiver. In [13] processing methods is reported implemented in the present ADS-B normally equipped with a single cha need an array antenna and a mu implemented, a more expensive so need a calibrated array. These alg beamformers by algebraic operatio arranged in a matrix. The algeb sources beamformers estimation diversity. In PA and EPA the dive different direction of arrival of the PASA the signal diversity relies on PA and PASA need a free-interfere source that has to be extracted, mea algorithm able to extract also sourc other. According to the considere superimposition in time with an airb a consistent signal time support wi this condition the best candidate app the EPA performance has been eva a ADS-B track, free and nnel these methods relies on the signal by the valid one, thus nd reducing the processor o in the case of separation he number of sources is has the capability to detect then a warning alert to for up, implementing a selfmethod, the Projection ASA) [10] , a single channel based methods [11] - [12] , Extended PA (EPA), for a a survey of other array d. The PASA can be ground stations, as they are annel receiver. PA and EPA ulti-channel receiver to be olution although they don't orithms derive the sources ons on the received data, braic method perform the exploiting the sources ersity is represented by the impinging signals, while in the signals frequency shift. ence time support for each anwhile EPA is a recursive ces completely mixed each d jammer waveforms, the borne signal doesn't provide ith only one source. Under pears to be the EPA. In [11] aluated: with a mixture of 2 signals the algorithm has a success rate of 90%. It is intended that, a case is success if the replies are detected and sent to the decoding block. Other separation methods based on array processing are [16] and [17] only useful for a very high traffic.
Note that the use of signal separation algorithms in conjunction with enhanced decoding techniques [18] add also a benefit in terms of channel capacity improvement [19] .
V. CONCLUSION
The effects of a jammer on an ADS-B receiver has been analyzed using a 1090 MHz multichannel receiver and a Software Defined Radio (SDR) source to generate the jammer waveforms. The results obtained by the decoding of the interference-free channel compared to the jammed one show reduced coverage and reduced detection probability. The jammer risk mitigation has been addressed by several papers. The proposed solutions are addressing high level methods, that need the implementation of new system concepts or the up-date of the actual systems functions. We propose a 'low level' method based on the implementation of a signal separation method in the ADS-B receiver, to be implemented upstream the detection and decoding procedures. The benefits of this solution relies on: i) the ADS-B station has the capabilities of a self integrity monitoring, ii) the implementation has not legacy problem and doesn't need the use of new system concepts, but it is easy realized by a detection/decoding receiver software up-date. Ongoing research activities are related to the performance study and analysis of the separation methods for ADS-B ground systems, and on the improvement of signal separation algorithms to better fit the jammer problem.
